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Faced with intense competition in the generics drugs industry, eroding margins, and 
continuous price pressures, Geneva Pharmaceuticals, the North American 
subsidiary of Novartis International AG, made a bold, multi-million dollar decision to 
reengineer all its demand and supply processes using the SAP R/3 system.  This 
case describes Geneva's journey through the first two of three phases of R/3 
implementation from mid-1997 to mid-2000, and the company's plans for Phase III 
(scheduled for completion by late-2000).  It highlights initial mistakes during this 
journey, strategies that helped overcome those mistakes, and how R/3 delivered 
operational efficiencies and competitive advantage under difficult business 
circumstances.  As the case illustrates, ERP implementation is much more than 
technology change, it also incorporates substantive process and people changes; 
and without appropriate change management strategies and experienced 
leadership, ERP projects are likely to fail.  
 
Keywords:  Enterprise resource planning, IS implementation, business 
process reengineering, project management. 
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I.  COMPANY BACKGROUND 
 
Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is one of the world’s largest generic drug 
manufacturers and the North American hub for the generic drugs division of Swiss 
pharmaceutical and life sciences company Novartis International AG.  Originally 
founded by Detroit pharmacist Stanley Tutag in 1946, Geneva moved its 
headquarters to Broomfield, Colorado in 1974.  Subsequently acquired by Ciba 
Corporation in 1979, Geneva became a part of Novartis when Ciba merged with 
Sandoz Ltd. in 1996, in the largest ever merger in the healthcare industry until that 
time.  Alex Krauer, Chairman of Novartis and former Chairman and CEO of Ciba, 
gave the rationale for the merger as: 
 
“Strategically, the new company moves us into a worldwide leadership 
position in life sciences.  Novartis holds the number two position 
[globally] in pharmaceuticals, number one in crop protection, and has 
tremendous development potential in nutrition.” (Annual Report, 1999). 
 
 
The name “Novartis” comes from the Latin term novae artes or new arts, 
which eloquently captures the company’s corporate vision: “to develop new skills in 
the science of life.”  Novartis inherited , a 200-year heritage of Ciba and Sandoz 
serving consumers in three core business segments (Table 1): 
• healthcare,  
• agribusiness, and  
• nutrition.   
Today, Basel, Switzerland based Novartis has 82,000 employees worldwide, runs 
275 affiliate operations in 142 countries, and generates annual revenues of 32 billion 
Swiss Francs (as of June 2000, 1 Swiss franc equaled approximately 0.6 U.S. 
dollars).  Novartis’ key financial data for the last five years (1995-99) are presented 
in Table 2.  The company’s American Depository Receipts trade on the New York 
Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol NVS. 
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Table 1.  Novartis’ Divisions and Business Units 
 















Table 2.  Novartis’ Five-Year Financial Summary 
 
 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 
Annual sales 32,465 31,702 31,180 36,233 35,943 
     Sales from healthcare 19,050 17,535 16,987 14,048 12,906 
     Sales from agribusiness 6,359 8,379 8,327 7,624 7,047 
     Sales from consumer health 7,056 5,788 5,866 5,927 5,777 
     Sales from industry - - - 8,634 10,213 
Operating income 7,056 7,356 6,783 5,781 5,714 
Net income 6,659 6,064 5,211 2,304 4,216 
Cash flow from operations 6,893 5,886 4,679 4,741 5,729 
R&D expenditure 4,246 3,725 3,693 3,656 3,527 
Total assets 65,527 55,375 53,390 58,027 50,888 
Net operating assets 24,759 20,913 19,619 21,820 22,278 
Number of employees 81,854 82,449 87,239 116,178 133,959 
Debt/equity ratio 0.27 0.28 0.41 0.46 0.46 
Current ratio 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.9 2.2 
Return on sales (%) 20.5 19.1 16.7 13.9 - 
Return on equity (%) 19.4 21.0 20.7 16.7 - 
Note:  All figures in millions of Swiss Francs, except otherwise indicated. 
           1995 data is on pro forma basis, based on pooled data from Ciba and Sandoz. 
 
 
Novartis’ generic drugs division is Novartis Generics.  This division is 
headquartered in Kundl (Austria), and its U.S. operations are managed by Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals.  In 1999, Geneva had revenues of $320 million, employed nearly 
1000 people, and manufactured over 4.6 billion dosage units of generic drugs.  The 
Geneva portfolio currently includes over 200 products in about 500 package sizes, 
covering a wide range of therapeutic categories, including nervous system disorders, 
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cardio-vascular therapies, and nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs.  Its major 
products include ranitidine, atenolol, diclofenac sodium, ercaf, metoprolol tartrate, 
triamterene with hydrochlorothiazide, and trifluoperazine.  Geneva’s business and 
product information is shown on the company’s web site at www.genevaRx.com. 
 
Generic drugs are pharmaceutically and therapeutically equivalent versions of 
brand name drugs with established safety and efficacy. For example, 
acetaminophen is the equivalent of the registered brand name drug Tylenol , aspirin 
is equivalent of Ecotrin , and ranitidine HCl is equivalent of Zantac . This 
equivalence is tested and certified in the U.S. by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), following successful completion of “bioequivalence studies,” in which the 
blood plasma levels of an active generic drug in healthy people are compared with 
that of a corresponding branded drug.  Maintaining a continuous pipeline of new 
drugs, regular clinical trials, and FDA approvals are therefore keys for survival in this 
industry. 
 
II.  INDUSTRY AND COMPETITIVE POSITION 
 
The generic drug industry in the U.S. is fragmented and highly competitive.  
Geneva is a leading player in this industry, ranked second in sales in 1996 and fifth 
in 1999.  The company’s competitors fall into three broad categories:  
• Generic drugs divisions of major branded drug companies, such as 
Warrick (a division of Schering-Plough), Apothecon (a division of Bristol 
Myers Squibb), 
• Independent generic drug manufacturers, such as Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 
Teva Pharmaceuticals, Barr Laboratories, Watson Pharmaceuticals, and 
• Drug distributors that have vertically integrated into generics 
manufacturing, such as AndRx. 
The industry also includes about 200 smaller players specializing in the manufacture 
of niche products.   
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Growth is particularly difficult, given the hyper-competitive nature of the 
industry.  Geneva’s business strategy emphasizes growth in two ways:  
• Internal growth over a select range of product types, and 
• Growth via acquisitions.   
For Geneva, internal growth was 14 percent in 1999 (no acquisitions in that year), 
primarily due to vigorous growth in the penicillin and cephalosporin businesses.  In 
pursuit of further growth, Geneva spent $52 million in 1997 to upgrade its 
manufacturing capacity (to 6 billion units annually) and another $23 million in 1998 
for clinical trials and new product development.  Unlike independent companies 
which typically use public stock markets to fund their growth strategies, Geneva 
relies on the financial strength of Novartis 
 
About 45 percent of medical prescriptions in the U.S. are currently filled with 
generic drugs, a figure that increased throughout the 1990’s.  This trend toward 
generics is driven by their lower costs (generic drugs typically cost 30-50 less than 
equivalent brands) and the growth of managed care providers such as health 
maintenance organizations (HMO), who generally prefer low-cost generics to more 
expensive branded alternatives.  However, no particular generics manufacturer has 
benefited from this trend, because of increased price-based competition and 
rampant “autosubstitution” in the industry.  Autosubstitution implies that distributors 
and pharmacies view generic products from different manufacturers as perfect 
substitutes and tend to freely substitute products of one company with that of 
another, based on product availability, pricing, and other measures.  Once 
substituted, it is very difficult to regain a customer account because pharmacies are 
generally disinclined to changing product brand, color, and packaging, to reduce 
confusion among consumers.  In addition, consumer trust toward generics remains 
low, following a widely-publicized generics scandal in the early 1990’s that did not 
involve Geneva.  Margins in this sector therefore remained extremely low, and 
Geneva and its competitors are continuously faced with pressure to reduce costs of 
operations. 
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Opportunities for international growth are limited for two reasons:   
• Consumers in some countries such as Mexico are culturally skeptical 
toward the lack of branding.   
• U.S. generics manufacturers are often undercut by competitors from India 
and China, where abundance of cheap labor and less restrictive regulatory 
requirements makes drug manufacturing less expensive. 
 
Continuous price pressures led to several mergers and acquisitions in the 
industry in recent years, as the acquirers seek economies of scale as a means of 
reducing costs.  The search for higher margins also led some generics companies to 
venture into the branded drugs sector, providing clinical trials, research and 
development, and additional manufacturing capacity for branded drugs on an 
outsourced basis. 
 
III.  CORE BUSINESS PROCESSES 
 
Geneva’s primary business processes are manufacturing and distribution.  
The company’s manufacturing operations are based at a 600,000 square foot facility 
in Broomfield, Colorado, while its two large distribution centers are located in 
Broomfield and Knoxville, Tennessee. 
 
Geneva’s manufacturing process is scientific, controlled, and highly precise.  
A long and rigorous FDA approval process is required prior to commercial 
production of any drug, the exact formulation of the drug or its “recipe” is 
documented.  Raw materials are sourced from suppliers (sometimes from foreign 
countries such as China), tested for quality (per FDA requirements), weighed (based 
on dosage requirements), granulated (i.e., mixed, wetted, dried, milled to specific 
particle sizes, and blended to assure content uniformity), and compressed into a 
tablet or poured into a gelatinous capsule.  Some products require additional 
coatings to help in digestion, stabilizing, regulating the release of active ingredients 
in the human body, or simply to improve taste.  Tablets or capsules are then 
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imprinted with the Geneva logo and a product identification number.  Following a 
final inspection, the medications are packaged in childproof bottles with a distinctive 
Geneva label, or inserted into unit-dose blister packs (aluminum foil wraps widely 
used for packaging drugs) for shipment.  
 
Manufacturing is done in batches; however, the same batch can be split into 
multiple product types such as tablets and capsules, or tablets of different dosages 
(e.g., 50 mg and 100 mg).  Likewise, finished goods from a batch can be packaged 
in different types of bottles, based on customer needs.  These variations add several 
layers of complexity to the standard manufacturing process and require tracking of 
three types of inventory:  
• raw materials,  
• bulk materials (the intermediate stage prior to packaging), and  
• finished goods.  
In some cases, additional intermediates such as coating solutions are also tracked.  
Master production scheduling is focused on the manufacture of bulk materials, 
based on forecasted demand and replenishment of “safety stocks” (of finished 
goods) at the two distribution centers.  Finished goods production depends on the 
schedule-to-performance, plus availability of packaging materials (bottles and blister 
packs), which are sourced from outside vendors.  
 
Bulk materials and finished goods are warehoused in the Broomfield and 
Knoxville distribution centers prior to shipping.  Since all manufacturing is done at 
Broomfield, inventory replenishment of manufactured products is done first at 
Broomfield and then at Knoxville.  To meet additional customer demand, Geneva 
also outsources production to smaller manufacturers, who produce and package 
generic drugs under Geneva’s label.  Most of these outsourcing vendors are located 
along the East Coast; hence, their finished goods is shipped first to the Knoxville and 
then to Broomfield.  Purchasing is simpler than manufacturing because it requires no 
bill of materials, no bulk materials management, and no master scheduling; Geneva 
simply converts planned orders to purchase requisitions, and then to purchase 
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orders, that are invoiced upon delivery.  However, balancing manufacturing and 
purchasing is a difficult task, as explained by Joe Camargo, Director of Purchasing 
and Procurement: 
 
“Often times, we are dealing with more than a few decision variables.  
We have to look at our forecasts, safety stocks, inventory on hand, and 
generate a replenishment plan.  We don’t want to stock too much of a 
finished good inventory because that will drive up our inventory holding 
costs.  We tend to be a little more generous on the raw materials side, 
since they are less costly than finished goods and have longer shelf 
lives.  We also have to factor in packaging considerations, since we 
have a pretty short lead time on packaging materials, and capacity 
planning, to make sure that we are making efficient use of our 
manufacturing capability.  The process is partly automated and partly 
manual, and often times we are using our own experience and intuition 
as much as raw numbers to make a good business decision.” 
  
Geneva supplies about 250 customers, including distributors (e.g., 
McKesson, Cardinal, Bergen), drugstore chains (e.g., Walgreen, Rite-Aid), grocery 
chains with in-store pharmacies (e.g., Safeway, Kroger), mail order pharmacies 
(e.g., Medco, Walgreen), HMOs (e.g., Pacificare, Cigna), hospitals (e.g., Columbia, 
St. Luke’s), independent retail pharmacies, and governmental agencies (e.g., U.S. 
Army, Veterans Administration, Federal prisons).  Distributors account for about 70 
percent of Geneva’s sales, with drugstore chains accounting for another 20 percent.  
Distributors purchase generic drugs wholesale from Geneva and resell them to retail 
and mail order pharmacies (some of whom are also Geneva’s direct customers).  
The volume and dollar amount of transactions vary greatly depending on the 
customer.  Distributors are sometimes willing to allow some lead time to fulfill a large 
order, but retail pharmacies are generally unwilling to make such concessions. 
 
One emerging potential customer segment is Internet-based drug retailers 
such as Drugstore.com and PlanetRx.com.  These online drugstores do not maintain 
any inventory of their own, but instead accept orders from retail customers and pass 
these orders to any wholesaler or manufacturer who can fill them on short notice.  
These small, customized, and unpredictable orders do not fit well with Geneva’s 
Communications of AIS Volume 4, Article 2      10 
SAP R/3 Implementation at Geneva Pharmaceuticals 
By A. Bhattacherjee 
wholesale, high-volume sales strategy, and hence, the company decided against 
direct retailing via mail order or Internet in the near future. 
 
Geneva uses a complex incentive system based on “rebates” and 
“chargebacks” to entice distributors and pharmacies to buy its products.  Such 
incentives are fairly standard in the generic drugs industry.  Each drug is assigned a 
“published industry price” by industry associations, but Geneva rebates that price to 
distributors on their sales contracts.  For example, if the published price of a certain 
drug is $10 and Geneva agreed to rebate that drug by $3 to a given distributor, then 
the contract price paid by that distributor for this drug is $7.  Rebate amounts are 
determined by the sales management based on negotiations with customers, and 
vary with customers, products, order volumes, and other considerations.  
Sometimes, customers receive offers to buy drugs at a cheaper rate from other 
manufacturers and ask Geneva to match or beat that discount.  Depending on how 
badly Geneva needs that customer or wants to push that product, it may offer a new 
rebate or increase an existing rebate.  Likewise, pharmacies ordering Geneva’s 
products are paid back a fraction of their dollar purchases as chargebacks.   
 
The majority of Geneva’s orders come through electronic data interchange 
(EDI).  These orders pass though multiple filters in an automated order processing 
system for error-checking (e.g., if the customer has an active customer number and 
adequate credit, if the item ordered is correct and available in inventory).  Customers 
are then assigned either to the Broomfield or Knoxville distribution center based on 
quantity ordered, order expiration dates, and whether the customer would accept 
split lots.  If the quantity ordered is not available at the primary center (say, 
Knoxville), a second allocation is made to the secondary center (Broomfield, in this 
case).  If the order cannot be filled immediately, a backorder is generated and the 
Broomfield manufacturing unit is notified.   Once filled, the distribution unit will print 
the order and ship it to the customer, and send order information to accounts 
receivable for invoicing.  The overall effectiveness of the fulfillment process is 
measured by two customer service metrics:  
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• the ratio between the number of lines on orders that are filled immediately 
(partial fills allowed) to the total number of lines ordered by customers 
(called “firstfill”), and  
• the percentage of items sent from the primary distribution center.   
Fill patterns are important because customers generally prefer receiving all items 
ordered in a single shipment. 
 
Matching customer demand to production schedules is often difficult because 
of speculative buying on the part of customers.  Prices of drugs are typically 
reassessed at the start of every fiscal year, and distributors may place very large 
orders at the end of the previous year to stock up on drugs whose prices are 
expected to increase next year.  Likewise, a distributor may place a large order at 
the end of its financial year to transfer cash-on-hand to cost-of-goods-sold, for tax 
purposes or to make itself look less attractive to a potential acquirer.  Unfortunately, 
most generic drug companies do not have the capacity to fulfill such orders on short 
notice. Yet failing to do so may result in the loss of an important customer.  While 
safety stocks help overcome some of these demands, maintaining such inventory 
consumes operating resources and reduces margins further. 
 
IV.  SAP R/3 IMPLEMENTATION DECISION 
 
Until 1996, Geneva’s information systems consisted of multiple software 
programs for managing mission-critical functions such as procurement, 
manufacturing planning, accounting, and sales.  The systems infrastructure was 
predominantly oriented around IBM's technologies.  The primary hardware platform 
was a mid-range IBM AS/400.  The software platform was based primarily on IBM's 
DB/2 database.  Desktop microcomputers were connected to the AS/400 via a 
token-ring (an IBM proprietary standard) local area network.   
 
Business units funded and deployed applications as needed in an ad hoc 
manner, without concern for maintenance or enterprise-wide interoperability.  For 
example,  
Communications of AIS Volume 4, Article 2      12 
SAP R/3 Implementation at Geneva Pharmaceuticals 
By A. Bhattacherjee 
• the manufacturing unit used the MacPac application for managing its 
materials requirements planning process,  
• financial accounting used Software/2000 for general ledger and accounts 
receivable, and  
• senior management used FYI-Planner for budgeting and planning.   
Data shared across business units (e.g., accounts receivable data was used by both 
order management and financial accounting, customer demand was used in both 
sales and manufacturing) were double-booked and re-keyed manually.  This 
configuration led to higher incidence of data entry errors, error processing costs, and 
data inconsistency.  Further, data was locked within “functional silos” and did not 
support new, value-added processes that cut across multiple business units (e.g., 
end-to-end supply chain management).  It was apparent that a common, integrated 
company-wide solution was required to improve data consistency and accuracy, 
reduce maintenance costs (e.g., data reentry, error correction), and enable value-
added processes. 
 
Toward this goal, in 1996, Geneva’s corporate management initiated a search 
for technology solutions that could streamline its internal processes, lower costs of 
operations, and position the company strategically to take advantage of new value-
added processes.  It wanted enterprise resource planning (ERP) software that could:  
• implement best practices in business processes,  
• integrate data across business units (hence reduce re-keying and 
maintenance costs),  
• enforce data standardization (to reduce software maintenance costs), 
• integrate well with new technologies or systems of acquired companies, 
• provide scalability with growing product and customer base, and  
• be Y2K (year 2000) compliant.   
The worldwide divisions of Novartis were considering two ERP packages at that 
time: BPCS from Software Systems Associates and R/3 from SAP.  Branded drug 
divisions decided to standardize their data processing environment on BPCS, and 
generics decided to implement SAP R/3 (however, each generics subsidiary 
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proceeded with its own independent R/3 implementation; severely limiting data 
sharing across subsidiaries).  A brief overview of the R/3 system is provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
R/3 implementation at Geneva was planned in three phases (Table 3).  Phase 
I would focus on supply side processes (e.g., manufacturing requirements planning, 
procurement planning), Phase II would be concerned with demand side processes 
(e.g., order management, customer service), and Phase III was aimed at integrating 
supply side and demand side processes to enable new value-added processes (e.g., 
supply chain management).  Randy Weldon, Geneva’s Chief Information Officer, 
outlined the goals of each phase as: 
 
“In Phase I, we were trying to get better performance-to-master 
[production] schedule and maybe reduce our cost of operations.  Our 
Phase II goals were to improve sales and operations planning, and as 
a result, reduce back orders and improve customer service.  In Phase 
III, we hope to achieve end-to-end supply chain integration, so that we 
can dynamically configure our production schedules based on 
fluctuating demands from our customers.” 
 
For each phase, specific R/3 modules were targeted for implementation.  These 
modules along with targeted processes and implementation timelines are listed in 
Table 3.  The three phases are described in the next three sections. 
 
Table 3.  R/3 Implementation Phases at Geneva 
 
Phase Business processes R/3 
modules 
Implementation timeline 
(inception to go-live) 
Vendor Selection    Mid-1997 






Nov 1997 – Feb 1999 
Phase II: Demand side 
management 
Order management, 
sales, customer service 
SD, MM3, 
FI/CO4 
Oct 1998 – Feb 2000 
Phase III: Supply/demand 
integration 
Sales & operations 





Early 2000 – Late 2000 
Notes: 1MM: Raw materials inventory 
                   2FI/CO: Accounts payable 
            3MM: Finished goods inventory 
                   4FI/CO: Accounts receivable 
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V.  PHASE I: SUPPLY SIDE IMPLEMENTATION  
 
Phase I of R/3 implementation started on November 1, 1997 with the goal of 
migrating all supply-side processes (e.g., purchasing management, capacity 
planning, master scheduling, inventory management, quality control, accounts 
payable) from diverse hardware/software platforms to a common, integrated R/3 
environment.   
 
THE NEED FOR R/3 
The application used previously to manage most of these processes was 
Macpac, which controlled shop floor operations, prepared master schedules, and 
performed maintenance management.  Macpac did not integrate well with software 
packages used in other Geneva business units (e.g., Software/2000, FYI Planner), 
and was limited in its functionalities.  For example, it did not have a simulation 
capability to run alternate production plans against the master schedule for “if-then” 
analysis, and could therefore not be used for estimation.   
Materials requirements planning (MRP) was only partially supported in that 
Macpac generated production requirements and a master schedule but did not 
support planned orders (i.e., generating planned orders, checking planned order 
items against inventory or production plan, and converting planned orders to 
purchase orders or manufacturing orders).  Consequently, planned orders were 
entered manually by sales personnel, which was expensive and left room for 
rekeying error.  The system also did not support distribution resource planning 
(DRP). Instead it generated a simple replenishment schedule based on predefined 
economic order quantities.  Macpac could perform capacity resource planning 
(CRP), but this feature was not used because it required heavy custom 
programming and major enhancements to master data.   
The system had already been so heavily customized over the years, that 
even a routine system upgrade was considered unwieldy.  Most important, the 
existing system placed Geneva at a disadvantage, since it did not accommodate 
new innovations in purchasing and procurement that could significantly impact costs 
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and service, such as consigned inventory, vendor-managed inventory, and 
paperless purchasing. 
The objectives of Phase I were therefore: 
• to migrate existing processes from Macpac to R/3,  
• automate supply side process that were not supported by MacPac, and  
• integrate all supply-side data in a single, real-time database that could 
exploit synergies across manufacturing and purchasing processes.   
System integration was expected to reduce inventory and production costs, improve 
performance-to-master scheduling, and help managers make more optimal 
manufacturing and purchase decisions.  Since R/3 would force all data to be entered 
only once (i.e., at source), it would reduce costs of data reentry, data reconciliation, 
and error correction.  The processes to be migrated from MacPac (e.g., MRP, 
procurement) were fairly standardized and efficient, and were hence not targeted for 
redesign or enhancement.  Three R/3 modules were scheduled for deployment:  
• materials management (MM),  
• production planning (PP), and  
• accounts payable portion of financial accounting (FI).   
 
Table A-2 in the Appendix provides brief descriptions of these and other common 
R/3 modules. 
 
STARTING WITH R/3 
Phase I of R/3 implementation employed ten IS personnel, ten full-time users, 
and ten part-time users selected from business units.  Whitman-Hart, a consulting 
company with prior experience in R/3 implementation, was contracted to assist with 
the migration effort.  The consultant team consisted of one R/3 basis (described in 
the Appendix) person (for implementing the technical core of the R/3 engine), three 
R/3 configurators (for mapping R/3 configuration tables in MM, PP, and FI modules 
to Geneva’s needs), and two programmers for custom coding unique requirements 
not supported by R/3. These programmers were skilled in ABAP/4, R/3’s proprietary 
programming language. The consultants brought in valuable experience and 
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expertise, which was vital, given that Geneva had no prior in-house experience in 
R/3 implementation at that time.  Verne Evans, Director of the Integrated Supply 
Chain unit and a MacPac “super user”, was assigned as the project manager for this 
phase.  SAP’s rapid implementation methodology called Accelerated SAP (ASAP) 
was selected for R/3 implementation, because of its promised implementation cycle 
of only six months. 
 
Four months later, in February 1998, Geneva found that little progress had 
been made in R/3 implementation despite substantial investments in hardware, 
software, and consultants.  System requirements were not defined correctly or in 
adequate detail; there was little coordination of activities among consultants, IS 
personnel, and user groups; and the project manager was unable to identify or 
resolve problems because he lacked prior R/3 experience.  In the words of a senior 
executive, “The implementation was clearly spinning out of control.”  Consultants 
employed by Whitman-Hart were technical specialists, but had little business 
experience with the pharmaceutical industry.  Though the ASAP methodology 
allowed a quick canned implementation, it was  
• not flexible enough to meet Geneva’s extensive customization needs,  
• did not support process improvements, and  
• alienated business users from system implementation.   
 
CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP 
 
To put the project back on track and give it leadership and direction, in 
February 1998, Randy Weldon was hired as Geneva’s new CIO.  Weldon brought in 
valuable R/3 project management experience from StorageTek, a leading 
manufacturer of magnetic tape and disk components also based in Colorado. 
 
By virtue of his prior R/3 experience, Weldon knew that ERP was 
fundamentally about people and process change, rather than about installing and 
configuring systems, and that successful implementation would require the 
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commitment and collaboration of three stakeholder groups: business users, IS staff, 
and consultants.  To solidify stakeholder commitment, the project management team 
was expanded from one person to three individuals: an IS manager, a functional 
manager, and a senior R/3 consultant.  Weldon was not particularly in favor of 
Whitman-Hart or the ASAP methodology.  However, for project expediency, he 
decided to retain Whitman-Hart and ASAP for the remainder of Phase I.  To reduce 
dependence on external consultants, several R/3 basis personnel and Oracle 
database administrators were hired on full-time basis.  Anna Bourgeois, with over 
three years of R/3 experience at Compaq Computers, was brought in to lead 
Geneva’s internal IS team. 
 
RESULTS OF PHASE I 
 
By February 1999, the raw materials and manufacturing component of R/3’s 
MM module was “up and running.”  But this module was not yet integrated with 
distribution (Phase II) and therefore did not have the ability to readjust production 
runs based on dynamically changing sales expectations.  However, several key 
performance indicators such as yield losses showed significant performance 
improvement following R/3 implementation.  For example, the number of planning 
activities performed by a single individual was doubled.  Job roles were streamlined, 
standardized, and consolidated, so that the same person could perform more “value-
added” activities.  Since R/3 eliminated the need for data rekeying and validating, 
inventory control staff responsible for data entry and error checking were reassigned 
to other purchasing and procurement tasks.  However, the realigned R/3 
implementation did not lead to all customizations desired by business users.  As 
Director of Purchasing and Procurement Camargo explained: 
 
“Ironically, one of the problems we have with SAP, that we did not 
have with Macpac, is the inability to carry two due dates - the original 
due date and the current due date – for each order, that helped us 
track actual production schedules against the original due date.  SAP 
only allows us to capture one single due date and we decided to retain 
our current due date, but that disrupted a portion of our planning 
process.  Now, we have to check our order fulfillment against the 
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original due date manually, offline, on a spreadsheet.  We can’t record 
that data either in SAP to measure performance improvements over 
time.” 
 
Bourgeois summed up the outcome of the implementation process as: 
 
“Phase I, in my opinion, was not done in the most effective way.  It was 
done as quickly as possible, but we did not modify the software, did not 
change the process, and did not write any custom report.  Looking 
back, we should have done some things differently.  We also had 
some problems with the consultants, and by the time I came in, it was 
a little too late to really make a change.  The good thing is that we 
learned from these mistakes, which will hopefully help us improve our 
implementation in Phases II and III.” 
 
 
VI.  PHASE II: DEMAND SIDE IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Phase II implementation started in October 1998 with the goals of redesigning 
demand-side processes such as marketing and sales, order fulfillment, customer 
service, and accounts receivable, and implementing the reengineered processes 
using R/3.   
 
Demand-side processes were much more complex than supply-side 
processes by virtue of their uniqueness and often had to be tracked manually.  
Figure 1 is a high-level illustration of Geneva’s order management process.  For 
example, Geneva’s rebate percentages varied across customers, across product 
categories for the same customer, and across order volumes for the same customer 
and product combination.  Such rebate structures could not be implemented using 
existing systems such as Macpac or FYI Planner.  In addition, the same customer 
sometimes had multiple accounts with Geneva and had negotiated a different rebate 
percentage for each account.  Implementing Phase II involved automating and/or 
redesigning these complex processes based on “best practices,” and was therefore 
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Figure 1. Geneva’s Order Management Process 
 
Further, because Geneva was undergoing major business transformations 
especially in customer sales and service, its prior systems were too inflexible to 
accommodate these changes.  For example, in 1998, Geneva started a customer-
based forecasting process for key customer accounts.  It was expected that more 
accurate prediction of order patterns from major customers would help the company 
“smooth out” its production schedules, improve capacity utilization, and reduce 
missed orders.  The prior forecasting software, FYI Planner, did not allow forecasting 
on a customer-by-customer basis.  Salespeople often did not have prior accounts 
receivable data for a given customer to make an informed decision on how to 
proceed with a sales transaction; this process was also likely to benefit from R/3’s 
data integration and real-time access capabilities.  Mark Mecca, Director of 
Customer Partnering, observed: 
 
“Before SAP, much of our customer sales and service were managed 
in batch mode using MacPac.  EDI orders came in once a night, 
chargebacks came in once a day, and invoicing was done overnight, 
shipments got posted once a day; so you wouldn’t know what you 
shipped for the day until that data was entered the following day.  SAP 
Communications of AIS Volume 4, Article 2      20 
SAP R/3 Implementation at Geneva Pharmaceuticals 
By A. Bhattacherjee 
will allow us to have access to real-time data across the enterprise.  
There will be complete integration with accounting, so we will get 
accurate accounts receivable data at the time a customer initiates a 
sales transaction.  Sometime in the future, hopefully, we will have 
enough integration with our manufacturing processes so that we can 
look at our manufacturing schedule and promise a customer exactly 
when we can fill his order.” 
 
Bourgeois was assigned overall responsibility of the project, by virtue of her 
extensive knowledge of EDI, R/3 interface conversion, and sales and distribution 
processes, and her prior role as a technical liaison between application and basis 
personnel.  Whitman-Hart was replaced by a new consulting firm, Arthur Anderson 
Business Consulting, to orchestrate Phases II and III of R/3 implementation.   A 
second consulting firm, Oliver White, specializing in operational processes for 
manufacturing firms, was brought in to help redesign Geneva’s sales and distribution 
processes using “best practices” prior to R/3 implementation.  Weldon reflected on 
the rationale for hiring two different consulting vendors: 
 
“Arthur Anderson was very knowledgeable in the technical and 
configurational aspects of SAP implementation, but Oliver White was 
the process guru.  Unlike Phase I, we were clearly targeting process 
redesign and enhancement in Phases II and III, and Oliver White 
brought in ‘best practices’ by virtue of their extensive experience with 
process changes in the manufacturing industry.  In Phase I, we made 
the mistake of hiring a consulting firm that had little experience in our 
processes, and that strategy backfired on us.  We wanted to be sure 
that we did everything right this time around.” 
 
Technical implementation in Phase II proceeded in three stages:  
• conceptual design,  
• conference room pilot, and  




In the conceptual design stage, key users most knowledgeable with the 
existing process were identified, assembled in a room, and interviewed, with 
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assistance from Oliver White consultants.  A core team of 20 IS personnel, users, 
and consultants worked full-time on conceptual design for 2.5 months (this team 
later expanded to 35 members during the conference room pilot stage).  Another 30 
business users were involved part-time in this effort; these individuals were brought 
in for focused periods of time (between 4 and 14 hours) to discuss, clarify, and agree 
on complex distribution-related issues.  The core team was divided into five groups 
to examine different aspects of the distribution process, such as: 
• product and business planning,  
• preorder (e.g., pricing, chargebacks, rebates, contracts),  
• order processing,  
• fulfillment (e.g., shipping, delivery confirmation), and  
• post-order activities (e.g., accounts receivable, credit management, 
customer service)  
 
Thirteen different areas of improvement were identified, of which four areas 
emerged as having the most impact on demand-side management and were 
therefore targeted for redesign.  These areas were: 
• product destruction,  
• customer dispute resolution,  
• pricing strategy, and  
• service level.   
 
Elaborate process models were constructed via the fish bone approach (a 
process mapping technique widely used in the industry for process analysis and 
improvement) for each of the four above areas to identify what factors drove these 
areas, what was the source of problems in these areas, and how could they be 
improved using policy initiatives.  Process diagrams were constructed on Post-it  
notes and stuck to the walls of a conference room for others to view, critique, and 
suggest modifications.  The following areas were analyzed: 
• scope and boundaries of existing processes, 
• inputs and deliverables of these processes,  
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• system interfaces,  
• suggested process customizations, and  
• required level of system flexibility.   
 
An iterative process was employed to identify activities that did not add value 
and generate alternative process flows.  The goal was to map the baseline or 
existing (“AS-IS”) processes, identify bottlenecks and problem areas, and create 
reengineered (“TO-BE”) processes.  This information became the basis for 
configuring the R/3 system during the subsequent conference room pilot. 
 
CONFERENCE ROOM PILOT 
 
During the conference room pilot, conceptual designs identified for the four 
key improvement areas were implemented as prototypes (by configuring appropriate 
R/3 modules) and tested.  Prototype tests examined system impacts on core 
demand-side processes such as forecast planning, contract pricing, charge-back 
strategy determination, receivables creation, pre-transaction credit checking, and 
basic reporting in a simulated environment.  The prototypes were modified several 
times based on test results and subsequent user feedback, and the final versions 
were rolled out using R/3’s ASAP methodology described in the Appendix.  
 
CHANGE MANAGEMENT  
 
In the change management stage, five training rooms were equipped with 
computers running the client version of the R/3 software to train users on the 
redesigned processes and the new R/3 environment.  A change management 
professional and several trainers were brought in to assist with this effort.  An 
advisory committee was formed to oversee and coordinate the change management 
activity.  This committee reported directly to the senior vice president level, and was 
given the mandate and resources to plan and implement any change strategies that 
they would consider appropriate.  Multiple “brown bag luncheons” were organized to 
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chart out the course of change and discuss what change strategies would be least 
disruptive.  Super users and functional managers, who had the organizational 
position to influence the behaviors of colleagues or subordinates in their respective 
units, were identified and targeted as potential change agents.  The idea was to 
“seed” individual business units with change agents that business users could trust 
and relate to, and use them to drive a grassroots program for change. 
 
To stimulate employee awareness, prior to actual training, signs were put up 
throughout the company that said, “Do you know that your job is changing?”  Internal 
company newsletters enhanced the project visibility by highlighting key milestones 
and addressing employee questions or concerns about the impending change.  A 
separate telephone line was created for employees to call anytime and inquire about 
the project and how their jobs would be affected.  The human resources unit 
conducted an employee survey to understand how employees viewed the R/3 
implementation and gauge their receptivity to changing job roles as a result of this 
implementation. 
 
Training proceeded full-time for three weeks.  Each user received an average 
of 3 to 5 days of training on process and system aspects.  Training was hands-on, 
team-oriented, and continuously mentored.  It was oriented around employees’ job 
roles such as how to process customer orders, how to move inventory from raw 
materials to finished goods, and how to make general ledger entries, rather than on 
how to use the R/3 system.  CIO Weldon justified this unique, non-traditional form of 
training as: 
 
“Traditional systems training does not work very well for ERP 
implementation because this is not only a technology change but also 
a change in work process, culture, and habits.  Changing attitudes and 
job roles that are ingrained in employees’ minds for years and in some 
cases decades, are very difficult to change.  Systems training tend to 
overwhelm less sophisticated users and they will think, ‘Oh my God, I 
have no clue what this SAP thing is all about, I don’t know what to do if 
the screen freezes, I don’t know how to handle exceptions, I’m sure to 
fail.’  Training should not focus on how they should use the system, but 
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on how they should do their own job using the system.  In our case, it 
was a regular on-the-job training rather than a system training, and 
employees approached it as something that would help them do their 
job better.” 
 
Several previously unknown factors were found during the training process.   
• First, considerable confusion existed about what employees’ exact job 
responsibilities were, even prior to R/3 implementation.  Significant time 
and resources were expended in reconciling these differences and 
eliminating ambiguity about employees’ post-implementation roles.   
• Second, Geneva’s departments were very much functionally oriented and 
wanted the highest level of efficiency from their department, sometimes to 
the detriment of other departments or the overall process.  This has been 
a sticky cultural problem, and while Phase II was underway, the IS 
advisory committee was working with senior management to see if any 
structural changes could be initiated within the company to affect a 
company-wide mindset change.   
• Third, Geneva realized that change must also be initiated on the customer 
side, so that customers are aware of the system’s benefits and are able to 
use it appropriately.  Customer education programs were created; 
however, in the interest of project completion, implementation of these 
programs was postponed until the completion of Phase III of R/3 
implementation.   
 
Phase II went live on February 1, 2000, as originally planned. 
 
RESULTS OF PHASE II 
 
The primary business metric tracked for Phase II implementation was 
customer service level.  Additional metrics included days of inventory on hand, dollar 
amount in disputes, and dollar amount destroyed.   Customer service was assessed 
by Geneva’s customers as: 
• Was the item ordered was in stock?  
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• Could Geneva fill the entire order in one shipment?  
• If backordered, was the backorder delivered on time?   
 
Based on these metrics, Geneva’s average customer service level before R/3 
was in the 80’s (measured on a 1-100 scale), well behind its industry competitors 
(many of whom rated in the mid 90’s).  Geneva expected that the R/3 
implementation would help the company achieve 99.5 percent service level by year-
end 2000.  Customer service dropped somewhat immediately following R/3 
implementation, but, Joe Camargo, Director of Purchasing and Procurement 
observed that this decrease was not due to R/3 implementation but because of an 
unforeseen capacity shortfall that planners did not identify quickly enough to 
implement contingency plans.  Camargo expected that such problems would be 
alleviated as performance-to-schedule and demand forecasting improved as a result 
of R/3 implementation. 
 
VII.  PHASE III: INTEGRATING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
 
Geneva’s quest for integrating supply and demand side processes began in 
1994 with its supply chain management (SCM) initiative.  But the initiative was 
shelved at that time due to a lack of system integration, immaturity of SCM as a 
business practice, and budgetary constraints.  The initiative resurfaced on the 
planning boards in 1998 under the leadership of Verne Evans, Director of Integrated 
Supply Chain.  From Evans’ point of view, R/3 promised accurate, consistent, and 
real-time data that was the lifeblood of SCM.  Geneva’s SCM goal was to implement 
“just-in-time” production scheduling, by dynamically updating manufacturing capacity 
and scheduling in response to continuously changing customer demands (both 
planned and unanticipated).  The targeted process was manufacturing resource 
planning (MRP-II) and more specifically, the Sales and Operations Planning (SOP) 
process within MRP-II. SOP linked planning activities in upstream (manufacturing) 
and downstream (sales) operations.  MRP-II and SOP processes are illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3 respectively. 
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Figure 2. Geneva’s Manufacturing Planning Process 
 
 
Figure 3. Geneva’s Manual Sales and Operations Planning Process 
 
SALES AND OPERATIONS PLANNING  
 
Until the mid-1990’s, Geneva had no formal SOP process, either manual or 
automated.  Manufacturing planning was isolated from demand data, and was 
typically based on historical demand patterns.  If a customer (distributor) placed an 
unexpected order or requested a change in an existing order, the manufacturing unit 
was unable to adjust its production plan to reflect this change.  This lack of flexibility 
led to unfilled orders or excess on-hand inventory, and sometimes dissatisfied or lost 
customers.  Prior sales and manufacturing systems were incompatible with each 
other and did not allow the integration of supply and demand data, as required by 
SOP. In case production plans required changes to accommodate a request from a 
major customer, such decisions were made based on intuition rather than business 
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rationale, which often had adverse effects on manufacturing and inventory 
management. 
 
To remedy these problems, Geneva started a manual SOP process in 1998 
(Figure 3).  In this approach, after the financial close of each month, sales planning 
and forecast data were  
• aggregated from order entry and forecasting systems,  
• validated, and  
• manually keyed into master scheduling and production planning systems.   
Likewise, production and inventory data from the prior period were entered into order 
management systems.  The supply planning and demand analysis teams performed 
independent analyses of what the target production and target sales should be.  
These estimates, which were often different, were reviewed and reconciled in a joint 
meeting of demand analysts and master schedulers.  Once an agreement was 
reached, senior executives (President of Geneva and Senior Vice Presidents), 
convened a business planning meeting to analyze the final production plan and 
demand schedule based on business assumptions, key customers, key performance 
indicators, financial goals and projections (market share, revenues, profits), and 
other strategic initiatives (e.g., new product introduction).   
 
The purpose of this high-level meeting was not so much to fine-tune the 
master schedule, but to examine it in light of corporate assumptions and growth 
estimates to develop a better understanding of the corporate business.  The entire 
planning process took 20 business days (one calendar month):  
• the first ten days were spent in data reentry and validation across different 
corporate systems,  
• followed by five days of demand planning,  
• two days of supply planning, and  
• three days of reconciliation.   
 
Communications of AIS Volume 4, Article 2      28 
SAP R/3 Implementation at Geneva Pharmaceuticals 
By A. Bhattacherjee 
The final business planning meeting was scheduled on the last Friday of the 
month, when production plans for the following month were approved.  By the time 
the planning process was completed one month later, Geneva had a well-designed 
production schedule that was one month late (since one month was spent in the 
planning process).  Given Geneva's dynamic business environment, the production 
schedule could vary significantly from one month to another, and hence the one-
month delay was disconcerting. Moreover, if the corporate management decided to 
override targeted production plans to accommodate special customer requests, such 
changes threw the entire SOP process into disarray.  
 
While the manual SOP process was a major improvement over the pre-SOP 
era, the manual process was time-consuming and constrained by errors in data 
reentry and validation across sales, production, and financial systems.  Further, the 
process took one month, and was not sensitive to changes in customer orders 
placed less than a month from their requested delivery dates.  Since much of the 
planning time was consumed in reentering and validating data across systems, 
Evans estimated that an automated system, that supported real-time integration of 
all supply and demand data in a single unified database, would eliminate ten days of 
data reentry and validation, thereby reducing the planning cycle to ten business 
days. 
 
Though SAP provided a SOP module with their R/3 package, Geneva’s R/3 
project management team believed that this module lacked the “business 
intelligence” necessary for generating an optimal production plan from continuously 
changing supply and demand data, even when all data were available in a common 
database.  The R/3 system was originally designed as a data repository, not an 
analysis tool to solve complex supply chain problems or provide simulation 
capabilities.  When SAP introduced a new Advanced Purchase Optimizer (APO) 
module in 1999 to help with data analysis, the combination of R/3’s SOP and APO 
modules was viewed as the answer to Geneva's unique SOP needs. 
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At the time of the case, in May2000, Geneva was in the initial requirements 
definition stage of SOP implementation.  To help with this effort, Oliver White 
created a template for aggregating all relevant SOP data required from distribution, 
operations, purchasing, quality control, and other functional databases, and tie these 
data to their source processes.  It was expected that the template would provide a 
common reference point for all business units participating in the SOP process and 
synchronize their decision processes. 
 
EXPECTED RESULTS OF PHASE III  
 
The primary business metric targeted for improvement in Phase III 
implementation is “available to promise” (ATP).  ATP measured whether Geneva is 
able to fulfill a customer order within the promised time.  It integrated customer 
service level with business performance, two key business metrics of the pre-SOP 
era.  Customers often placed orders too large to be fulfilled immediately, and ATP 
was expected to provide customers with reasonably accurate dates for complete or 
partial order fills.  Geneva believed that generating and meeting fulfillment dates 
would help the company improve its customer service levels more than not providing 
any dates at all.  ATP is even more important in the context of thin inventories and 
just-in-time manufacturing that were expected to drive cost reduction and business 
success in the hyper-competitive generics industry as Geneva is forced to explore 
new means of cost reduction.  Evans explains the role of ATP at Geneva as: 
 
“Most of our customers understand the dynamics of our business, and 
how difficult it is for us to fulfill a large order in short notice with limited 
production capacity.  Many of them are willing to bear with backorders 
if we can promise them a reasonable delivery date for their backorder 
and actually deliver on that date.  That way, we take less of a customer 
service level hit than defaulting on the order or being unable to 
accommodate it.  In commodity businesses such as ours, customer 
service is the king.  Our customers may be willing to pay a little 
premium over the market for assured and reliable service, so that they 
can meet their obligations to their customers.  Customer service may 
be a strategic way to build long-term relationships with our customers, 
but of course, we are far from proving or disproving that hypothesis.” 
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In May 2000, when this case was written, Phase III was still in the early 
planning stage. As indicated in Table 3 in Section IV, implementation is not 
scheduled until late 2000.  
 
 
VIII.  EPILOGUE 
 
 Despite initial setbacks, by May 2000, Geneva was back on the road to a 
successful R/3 implementation.  Senior management, functional units, and IS 
personnel are all enthusiastic about the project and looking forward to R/3’s 
deployment in all operational areas of business and beyond.  R/3 implementation 
provided Geneva with additional means for survival in the intensely competitive 
generic drugs industry.  CIO Weldon provided an overall assessment of the 
company's R/3 implementation: 
 
“In my opinion, we are doing most of the same things as before, but we 
are doing them better, faster, and with fewer resources.  We are able 
to better integrate our operational data, and are able to access that 
data in a timely manner for making critical business decisions.  At the 
same time, SAP implementation has placed us in a position to 
leverage future technological improvements and process innovations, 
and we expect to grow with the system over time.” 
 
 
In May 2000, the primary focus of Geneva’s R/3 implementation is timely 
completion of Phase III by December 2000.  Once completed, the implementation 
team plans to explore some of R/3’s additional capabilities that are currently not 
planned for implementation.  R/3 modules planned for future consideration include 
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APPENDIX 
WHAT IS SAP R/3? 
 
SAP (Systems, Applications, and Products in Data Processing) AG is the 
world’s fourth largest software company, and the largest enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) vendor.  The company was founded in 1972 by Dr. H.C. Hasso 
Plattner and Dr. Henning Kagermann in Walldorf, Germany with the goal of 
producing an integrated suite of application software, that would run all mission-
critical corporate operations, from purchasing to manufacturing to order fulfillment 
and accounting.  This integration would help companies optimize their supply chains, 
manage customer relationships, and make better management decisions.  As of 
year-end 1999, the company had annual revenues of $5 billion, annual growth of 44 
percent, over 10,000 customers in 107 countries, 19,300 employees, and 36 percent 
of the ERP market.  SAP brings in 26 years of leadership in process innovations and 
ERP, and invests 20 percent of its revenues back into research and development. 
 
SAP’s first breakthrough product was the R/2 system, which ran on 
mainframe computers.  R/2 was called an ERP system, since it extended the 
functions of earlier MRP systems in manufacturing firms to include other business 
processes such as sales, accounting, and human resources.  In 1992, SAP released 
the R/3 system, a client/server variant of the earlier R/2 system.  Today, R/3 is 
installed in over 20,000 locations worldwide and R/2 in about 1300 locations.  Initially 
targeted at the world’s largest corporations such as AT&T, BBC, Deutsche Bank, 
IBM, KPMG, Merck, Microsoft, Nestle, Nike, and Siemens, R/3 has since been 
deployed by companies of diverse sizes, geographical locations, and industries.  
SAP software is available for 18 comprehensive industry solutions (called 
“verticals”), covering specific industry sectors such as banking, oil & gas, electronics, 
health care, and public sector. 
 
R/3 is designed as an “open” solution, i.e., it can run on a variety of hardware 
platforms such as Sun, IBM, or HP servers, Intel-based servers, and IBM AS/400, 
and software environments such as UNIX, Windows NT, and OS/400.  R/3 uses a 
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thin client and a three-tier architecture, consisting of database, application, and 
presentation tiers (Figure A-1).  The database server provides a common, central 
repository of all organizational data, and supports a variety of relational back-end 
databases, including Oracle, Microsoft SQL Server, DB2, Informix, and ADABAS.  
The application server provides job scheduling, print spooling, user validation, and 
application programming interfaces (API) required for connecting any presentation 
server to any database server.  The presentation server provides desktop graphical 
user interfaces (GUI) running on thin clients, makes data requests to the application 
server, and presents formatted data returned from the application server.  Front-end 
GUIs supported by R/3 include Windows 3.1/95/NT, OS/2, Macintosh, and 
OSF/Motif.  SAP requires a TCP/IP networking environment, but supports a wide 
variety of middleware such as remote procedure call (RPC), dynamic data exchange 
(DDE), and object linking and embedding (OLE) for client-server interaction.   














User request processing: 
1 User requests data or transaction from presentation server via the GUI 
2 Presentation server relays user requests to appropriate application servers via set of 
middleware 
3 Application server creates appropriate SQL queries and transmits them to the 
database server 
4 Database server processes the query and returns results to application server 
5 Application server returns the data to the requesting presentation server 
6 Presentation server formats data and presents it to the user. 
  Figure A-1.  R/3’s Three-Tier Client/Server Architecture 
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R/3 is organized in form of over 8,000 configuration tables that define how the 
system should function, how transaction screens should look like, and how users 
should use it.  Although R/3 can be implemented as a “standard” application, 
generally some configuration is required to meet customer-specific business needs, 
which is done by changing settings within the configuration tables.  Implementers 
first model how a business process should function, then map these models into 
“scripts,” and finally translate scripts into configuration table settings.  Implementing 
R/3’s basic modules typically takes 18 to 24 months.  However, SAP’s rapid 
implementation methodology, Accelerated SAP (ASAP), promises implementation 
cycle time of six months.  This methodology provides a detailed roadmap of the 
implementation life cycle, organized in five phases (project preparation, business 
blueprint, realization, final preparation, and go live), with detailed lists of activities to 
be performed in each phase.  It also provides checklists, predefined templates (e.g., 
business processes, cut-over plans), project management tools, questionnaires 




Table A-1.  System Platforms Supported by R/3 
 
 UNIX platform NT platform AS/400 platform 
Hardware Bull, DEC, HP, IBM, 
SNI, Sun 
AT&T, Compaq, DEC, 





AIX, Digital UNIX, HP-
UX, Linux, Sinix, 
Solaris 
Windows NT OS/400 
Database Adabas D, DB2 for 
UNIX, Informix-Online, 
Oracle 7.1 
Adabas D, MS SQL 
Server 6.0, Oracle 7.1 
DB2/400 
GUI Windows 3.1, Windows 95, Windows NT, 









Middleware ALE, DDE, EDI, OLE, Mail, RFC, Q-API, CPI-C 
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R/3 is packaged as a set of application modules  plus the core system called 
the Basis System.  Table A-2 lists common R/3 modules, their functions, and key 
elements The basis system provides the operating system, database, 
communications middleware, and technical infrastructure required by all application 
modules, and also manages the data dictionary, security, ABAP/4 programming 
workbench, operations, transactions, change requests, and administration.  A 
customer may implement the core plus any combination of application modules, 
depending on specific business needs.  These modules interact with business data 
defined as objects.  R/3 configuration involves setting up “values” for these 
attributes, building custom forms to map business processes, building interfaces to 
transfer data across applications, and populating data from prior databases after 
appropriate data mapping, cleansing, conversion, and extraction (using SAP-
supplied tools such as BDC or IDOC). 
 
Although R/3 typically supports 80 to 95 percent of a large company’s needs, 
certain unique functionality or specialized business processes may not be 
supported.  This unique functionality can be obtained in four ways:  
• interfacing R/3 to existing legacy systems using SAP-supported middleware, 
• interfacing R/3 to third-party (SAP partners) solutions, typically written in C or 
C++,  
• writing custom software in ABAP/4 (a proprietary fourth generation language) 
to extend R/3’s functionality, and  
• modifying R/3 source code directly (this approach is strongly discouraged by 
SAP and may lead to loss of after-sales support).   
 
The broad scope and immense complexity of R/3 implementation require 
hiring of consulting firms (e.g., Anderson Consulting, Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
KPMG), for configuring the system based on business specifications, custom-coding 
additional requirements using ABAP/4, and planning and managing company-wide 
rollout, training, and change management.  The R/3 software may cost between 
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Table A-2.  R/3’s Application Modules 
 
 Module name Description Key elements 
FI Financial 
accounting 
Designed for automated management 
and reporting of GL, A/R, A/P, and other 
sub-ledger accounts with a user-defined 
chart of accounts. 
General ledger, Accounts payable, Accounts 
receivable, Treasury, Special-purpose ledger, 
Legal consolidation, Accounting information 
system. 
CO Controlling Represents the company’s flow of cost 
and revenue, and is a management 
instrument for organizational decision.   
Cost/profit center accounting, Job order 
accounting, Project accounting, Product 
costing analysis, Activity based costing, 
Profitability analysis.  
AM Asset 
management 
Designed to manage and supervise 
individual aspects of fixed assets. 
Plant maintenance (repair, schedule), 
Inventory control, Traditional asset accounting 
(depreciation, etc.), Investment management. 
PS Project 
system 
Supports the planning, control, and 
monitoring of long-term, highly complex 
products with defined goals, accelerates 
work and data flows. 
Funds and resource management, Quality 
control, Time management, Project 
management. 
WF Workflow Links SAP R/3 modules with cross-
application technologies, tools, and 





Combines SAP R/3 modules with 
additional industry specific functionality. 
Segments: Consumer packaged goods, 
Utilities/telecommunications, Healthcare, 




Supports the planning and control of 
personnel activities 
Payroll accounting, Travel expense 
accounting, Benefits, Recruitment, Workforce 




Supports the planning, processing, and 
completion of plant maintenance tasks, 
track maintenance costs, and make 
maintenance decisions 
Processing of unplanned tasks, Service 
management, Maintenance planning, 
Maintenance bill of materials, Plant 
management information system. 
QM Quality 
management 
Supports quality planning and control for 
manufacturing and procurement. 




Supports planning and control of 
manufacturing activities. 
Bill of materials, Work centers, Sales and 
operations planning, Master production 
scheduling, Material requirements planning, 
Shop floor control, Product costing, Kanban. 
MM Materials 
management 
Supports the procurement and inventory 
functions in daily operations. 
Purchasing, Inventory management, Reorder 
point processing, Invoice verification, Material 
valuation, External services management. 
SD Sales & 
distribution 
Helps optimize all tasks and activities 
carried out in sales, delivery, and billing. 
Pre-sales support, Inquiry processing, 
Quotations, Sales order processing, Delivery 
processing, Billing. 
 
Note:  This list of SAP R/3 modules is not complete.  New modules were being added when this case was 




$50,000 and $10 million; hardware and accessories may cost approximately an equal 
amount and consulting typically costs at least twice that of software costs. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ABAP/4 R/3's native programming language 
API  Application programming interface 
ASAP  Accelerated SAP (SAP's rapid development methodology) 
ATP  Available-to-promise (a R/3 module) 
BPR  Business process reengineering 
CO  Controlling (a R/3 module) 
CRP  Capacity requirements planning 
DRP  Distribution requirements planning 
EDI  Electronic data interchange 
ERP  Enterprise resource planning 
FDA  Food and Drug Administration (a federal regulatory agency) 
FI  Finance (a R/3 module) 
GUI  Graphical user interface 
HMO  Health maintenance organization  
MM  Materials management (a R/3 module) 
MRP  Materials requirements planning 
MRP-II Manufacturing resource planning 
PP  Production planning (a R/3 module) 
R/3  Client/server based ERP package from SAP 
SAP Systems, Applications, and Products in Data Processing  
(the world's largest ERP vendor) 
 SCM  Supply chain management 





1. What are the similarities and differences between ERP implementation and 
other large-scale information systems projects?   
 
2. What went wrong with the Phase I of R/3 implementation at Geneva, and how 
were these problems corrected?  What did Geneva do right in Phase II, which 
was considerably more complex than Phase I?  Use your preceding answers 
to generate a list of critical success factors that can enable ERP project 
success?   
 
3. What suggestions do you have for Geneva's management for managing the 
implementation of Phase III?  Note that Phase III requires data and process 
integration of unprecedented scale, and involves novel processes not 
previously tried out at Geneva. 
 
4. Currently, ERP vendors (e.g., SAP, Peoplesoft, Oracle) are being threatened 
by the advent of business-to-business electronic commerce players (e.g., 
Ariba, CommerceOne).  In response to these competitive threats, ERP 
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vendors are themselves transitioning to e-commerce.  Examine SAP’s e-
commerce portal MySAP.com and comment on the pros and cons of the e-
commerce approach relative to the client-server based R/3 system. 
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